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In this paper, I reconstruct the reasons why Aristotle thinks that musical education is important 
for moral education. Musical education teaches us to appropriately enjoy and to recognize fine 
melodies and rhythms. Fine melodies and rhythms are similar to the kind of movements fine 
actions consist in and fine characters display. By teaching us to appropriately enjoy and to 
recognise fine melodies and rhythms, musical education can thus train us to perceptually 
recognise and appropriately enjoy fine actions and characters. This is how musical education 
leads us, up to a point, toward the actions and character dispositions a virtuous life requires. 
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Introduction 
 
Aristotle believes that music is very important for the formation of character. Musical 
education can lead us toward virtue when we are still young and unable to understand 
what virtue and happiness are, and why they matter (see Pol. viii 1340a1 ff. and NE x 
1179b20 ff.). In Classical Greece, the beneficial effects of musical education were to a large 																																																								
1 This paper would not have been written without the help and comments of my advisors 
Ursula Coope and Jessica Moss. I am very grateful to them and David Charles, Michael 
Coxhead, Ana Laura Edelhoff, Susanne Herrmann-Sinai, Brad Inwood, Terry Irwin, Harvey 
Lederman, Giles Pearson, Damien Storey, two anonymous referees and the participants to 
the Oxford Workshop in Ancient Philosophy for their helpful comments and advice on 
earlier drafts. I also owe a great intellectual debt to Andrew Barker’s work on Ancient 
Greek music in general and on the structural similarity between musical movements and 
actions in particular. The responsibility for the remaining mistakes is mine. 
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extent taken for granted.2 Understanding Ancient Greek views on the moral effects of 
musical education is especially difficult for us because they often seem to amount to an 
unreflective acceptance of a traditional belief. In this paper, I look at Aristotle’s theory of 
musical education as we find it in the Politics viii and in the Problems xix. Starting from 
Aristotle’s focus on melody and rhythm, I argue that he does provide his theory of 
musical education with solid philosophical grounding. In his view, musical education 
does not rely on the blind transmission of emotions, but it is a kind of perceptual 
training. This training teaches us to perceptually recognise fine actions and characters 
and to enjoy and pursue them for their own sake. 
Melody and Rhythm 
 
Aristotle mentions harmonia in his account of musical education (Pol. viii 1340a40 and Pol. 
viii 1341b34 ff.), but he is mostly interested in melody (melos) and rhythm (rhythmos): 
We see that music is made of melodies and rhythms, and we should know what 
influence each of these has on education ...3 
This specific interest in melody and rhythm can guide us in interpreting his theory. One 
of the difficulties of trying to understand Ancient Greek accounts of musical education 
stems from the semantic breadth of the term mousikē. Mousikē can include poetry, story-
telling, the combination of dancing, singing and acting that we find in Greek tragedies as 
well as music strictly speaking, that is, merely instrumental and vocal music. Aristotle’s 
focus on melody and rhythm helps us to overcome this interpretive difficulty. It clearly 
indicates that he is especially interested in the educational powers of music in the strict 
sense, and not merely as an accompaniment to poetry or theatrical representations. This 
doesn’t of course mean that Aristotle is not at all interested in the educational power of 																																																								
2 Plato discusses musical education in the Rep. iii and Laws ii and vii, and probably takes his 
cue from and develops the views already exposed by Damon (Rep. iii 400b-c) and the 
Pythagoreans. The relationship between Plato, Damon and the Pythagoreans is a wide 
and controversial topic, and the following list of representative sources is far from being 
exhaustive: on Damon see Aristides Quintilianus, De Musica, 2.14 and on the difficulty of 
reconstructing the analogies and differences between Damon and the Pythagoreans see 
Woerther 2008, 93 fn. 19. It is doubtful whether Damon proposed a fully worked out 
theory of the benefits of musical education (see Barker 2007, 11-12 and 252 fn. 29 and 
Wallace 2004). 
3 τὴν μὲν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν, τούτων δ᾽ ἑκάτερον οὐ δεῖ 
λεληθέναι τίνα δύναμιν ἔχει πρὸς παιδείαν ... Pol.viii 1341b24-25. Translations of the 
Politics are based, sometimes loosely, on Kraut 1997. For the specific interest in melody 
and rhythm see Pol. viii 1340a39 and Pol. viii 1340a19-20. 
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music as an accompaniment of tragedy or poetry. It just suggests that this kind of music 
is not the main focus of the Politics viii (see also Pol. viii 1340a14-b26, Brüllmann 2013, 356-
57, Ford 2004, 316 ff.). In this respect, Aristotle’s Politics viii is similar to Plato’s Rep. iii 
398c-403c and different from Plato’s Laws ii 665a-c, where the focus is on Mousikē as 
including chōreia, the art of dancing and singing (on the Republic see Schofield 2010 and 
Barker 2005, 19-57, and on Republic and the Laws see Pelosi 2010). 
The focus on melody and rhythm also implies that Aristotle is especially interested in the 
progressive nature of music as a movement (see Barker 2005, 108 ff.).4 Harmonia, melody 
and rhythm are the three fundamental components of an Ancient Greek musical piece. 
Harmonia means first and foremost tuning, the different tension and organization that we 
can give to strings of a lyre or kithara depending on the piece we have to play. Harmonia 
also has a secondary use, whereby it means mode. A mode is a set of distinctive intervals 
in a scale, upon which different melodies can be constructed (see West 1992, 178 ff. and 
Barker 2005, 21 ff.). Harmonia, in both cases, furnishes the static structure upon which the 
composer or the performer can base their composition or execution. 
Unlike harmonia, melody is a movement which can be descending, ascending, jumpy or 
following the scale step by step. Melody has a progressive feature which harmonia lacks 
(see West 1992, 190 ff and Aristides Quintilianus De Musica ii, 21, cf. 16.18-17.2, 81.4-6, 
130.2, Ptolemy Harmonics ii.12. Barker 1990, 2:341 n. 96, 418, 430 ff., 483, 531). 
Ancient Greek rhythm generally drew upon the metric of verses, and was based on the 
binary opposition between “short” and “long” syllables. The division between the two 
was probably very well defined, with the long duration lasting twice as long as the short 
one (West 1992, 129 ff.). Ancient Greek metric and rhythmic where however distinct, and 
some of the most important sources, including Aristoxenus, do not discuss metrical 
analysis at length. In some cases, rhythmicians and metricians used a completely 
different terminology and classification for the same measures (see Aristides Quintilianus 
De Musica i, 38. 5, West 1992, 137 ff. and Pearson 1990 for Aristoxenus’ Elementa Rhythmica). 
Thus rhythm, like harmonia, gives a fixed structure to the otherwise confused movements 
of the melody (Aristides Quintilianus, De Musica i, 31. 10-13, trans. Barker 1990, 2:434). Yet, 
unlike harmonia, Ancient Greek rhythm has a progressive, as well as a static, aspect. Not 
only can it structure the pattern of the movement and determine the proportion of 
“long” and “short” notes, but it can also determine the tempo (West 1992, 158 ff. and 
Problems xix. 38). 
Their distinctive progressive nature explains why Aristotle is especially interested in 
melody and rhythm, as opposed to harmonia. In light of this clarification concerning the 																																																								
4 My argument in this paper is indebted to Barker’s analysis of the similarity between the 
temporal development of actions and melodies, and differs from his view in so far as it 
focuses on the fact that what matters for Aristotle is that actions, characters and music 
are called “fine” for similar reasons. 
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relevance of the progressive aspects of music in the Politics, we can return to Aristotle’s 
account of musical education. 
Musical  Education and Emotion Transmission 
 
Musical education is certainly not meant to lead us all the way toward the acquisition of 
virtue.5 Nevertheless, it is reasonable to think that musical education, as it is described in 
the Politics, is at least capable of contributing to moral education as it is described in the 
Nicomachean Ethics. Both treatises rely on the same educational principles and employ 
similar expressions. For example, they stress the importance of habituating moral 
trainees to feel pleasure and pain correctly, or as one should (NE ii 1104b11-12, NE x 
1179b24-26 and Pol. viii 1340a15-17). 
Aristotle concentrates on the contribution of musical education to moral education in Pol. 
viii 1340a10-b20. Lines a15-17 summarise how musical education is meant to work: 
Since then it happens that music is a pleasure, and virtue happens to be about 
rejoicing and loving and hating rightly, it is clear that there is nothing that we 
should learn and to which we should habituate ourselves more than correctly 
distinguishing and rejoicing at good characters and fine actions.6 
It is easy to see why, as this passage suggests, we need both to learn how to discriminate 
correctly fine actions and characters and also to habituate ourselves to rejoice at fine 
actions and characters. As we know from the Nicomachean Ethics, in order to become 
virtuous we need both to learn to recognize what is good and fine, and also to habituate 
ourselves to rejoice at it (see NE ii, and inter alia Burnyeat 1980, Broadie 1991, 103 ff., 
Sherman 1989, 157 ff.). But why should music have anything to do with virtue, and more 
specifically with learning and habituation? The only information this passage gives us is 
that music is pleasant, and not much appears to follow from that. 
In the following lines, Aristotle adds some details to his account. First, he suggests that 
melodies and rhythms can be educational because in them we find likenesses 
(homoiōmata) or imitations (mimēmata) of characters and emotions (Pol. viii 1340a21-25 
																																																								
5 I thank an anonymous referee for pressing this point. 
6 ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, τὴν δ’ ἀρετὴν περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς 
καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθίζεσθαι μηθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ 
κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· Pol. viii 
1340a15-17. See the Platonic parallel at Rep. iii 401b-402c. 
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and 1340a39).7 Second, he argues that music, unlike paintings and sculptures, has a 
special status, for in melodies themselves we find a true likeness or mimēsis of character (Pol. 
viii 1340a27-39). Third, he demonstrates that melodies affect us differently depending on 
the harmonia they are based on: 
In the melodies themselves there are imitations of character, and this is clear. For 
the nature of the harmoniai is simply different, and as a result listeners are put 
into different dispositions and do not have the same way of reacting to each of 
them. The reaction to some (the one called Mixolydian, for example) is more 
mournful and grave; but to some others (the more relaxed harmoniai, for example) 
they react by weakening their intellect ... this applies in the same way to rhythms. 
For some of them have a steadier character, others a dynamic one, and among 
them some have more constrained movements, others have movements more fit 
for the free.8 
Music’s affective powers are, for Aristotle, a sign that we can find imitations and 
likenesses of character in melodies. The different emotional reactions to a piece of music 
are a result of the different nature of its harmonia or its rhythm.  
Some interpreters take their cue from this passage to argue that music’s affective powers 
are more than a sign of its mimetic nature. They argue that music’s affective powers are 
able to explain its educational powers too (see Woodruff 1992, 91, Woerther 2008, 100, 
Barker 2005, 103-5).9 It is however unlikely that Aristotle associated music’s educational 																																																								
7 Throughout the Politics viii, Aristotle writes either that we find likenesses (or imitations) 
of character in melodies and rhythms or that melodies and rhythms have likenesses of 
character. As I argue below, these are two ways of saying the same thing, i.e. that music is 
in some way similar to character. 
8 ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν (καὶ τοῦτ’ ἐστὶ φανερόν· εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ 
τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις, ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατίθεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν 
τρόπον πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότως 
μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, 
οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας, ... τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ 
ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς 
κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας). Pol. viii 1340a40-b10 Aristotle’s use of the term harmonia 
suggests that harmonia is used here a synonymous with melody, for it is what is listened 
to (i.e., it is the object of akouontas). On this point see Kraut 1997, 198-99. 
9 According to Brüllmann 2013, 365 ff., music’s affective powers explain why music 
contains likenessess of characters, but do not explain why it is educational. According to 
Woodruff 1992 and Woerther 2008, 100, music’s affective powers explain both why 
music’s is a likeness or mimesis of certain emotions and why it is educational. According 
to Barker 2005, 103-5 music’s affective powers explain its educational function, but not its 
special mimetic nature (Barker 2005, 103-5). 
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function with its affective powers only. Music, especially if it is not accompanied by 
words, moves us emotionally without transmitting the intentional content of emotions. It 
can make us feel, say, angry and combative without making us think or imagine a slight 
and a pleasant revenge. But these contentless emotions cannot train us not to feel angry 
at the wrong time and towards the wrong people. Hence, they could not help us to 
acquire the correct character disposition, as Aristotle understands it, with regards to 
anger or any other emotion (see e.g. NE iv 5 and Brüllmann 2013, 368-72 for the same 
critique). For similar reasons, the thesis that musical education provides us with 
representations or paradigms of fine actions and characters is implausible. Instrumental 
music, or music without words, seems unable to represent or mimic actions and 
characters in this way (contra Sherman 1989, 183 ff. and Hitz 2012, 298 ff.). 
One might object that musical education can work even if it is blind, provided it is 
suitably controlled. By exposing children to music that gives rise to good emotions and 
by keeping them away from music that gives rise to shameful emotions, we can help 
them to associate pleasure with good emotions. This simpler account of the contribution 
of music’s affective powers to moral education, however, is still unconvincing. Although 
we might think that for Aristotle some emotions like paralysing panic or uncontrollable 
fury are shameful in all circumstances, there is no evidence that he took some others to 
be always good or fine. Joy, anger or fear are good in some circumstances, and 
inappropriate in others. Hence, it is hard to believe that he thought music capable of 
teaching us to associate pleasure blindly with some emotions which are always good or 
fine.  
Furthermore, Aristotle himself suggests that musical education doesn’t merely transmit 
blind emotions, but addresses our recognitional faculties too. At Pol. viii 1340a15-17, Pol. 
viii 1340b20-25 and Pol. viii 1340b35-39, the point of musical education seems to be to train 
us to recognize fine melodies, fine actions and good characters as well as to rejoice at 
them. Hence, we have some good reasons to think that Aristotle’s musical education is 
unlikely to work as blind emotion transmission. In order to explain music’s educational 
powers, we need to look beyond its affective powers. 
Melodies,  Rhythms, Actions and Characters  
 
The educational powers of music can be better understood if we focus on its progressive 
nature, which is especially evident in its melodic and rhythmic aspects. Music’s 
progressive nature suggests that there are important similarities between melodies, 
rhythms, actions and characters. These similarities explain why in melodies and rhythms 
there are likenesses and imitations of characters and actions. First, melodies, rhythms, 
actions and characters are alike in their temporal development. Second, fine actions and 																																																																																																																																																																										
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fine characters are similar to fine melodies and rhythms. Third, finely listening to a 
musical piece is similar to acting finely and to finely displaying a virtuous character state. 
In this section, I analyse these similarities in turn. In the final section, I argue that 
musical education can work as a morally relevant training precisely in virtue of these 
special similarities between music, actions and characters. 
Let us start from the similarities in temporal development. Music’s progressive nature 
distinguishes it from statuary and painting. It explains why likenesses of actions and 
characters are found especially in music: 
It so happens that in the other objects of perception, as in the objects of touch and 
taste, there is no likeness of characters, although in the objects of vision there is a 
little (figures [sc. of statuary, but presumably paintings too] are of this kind, but 
only a little, and not everyone shares in this kind of perception. Furthermore, 
these resulting figures and colours of characters are not likenesses of characters, 
but more signs, and these signs are distinguishing marks for the emotions ...) but 
in melodies themselves there are imitations of characters.10 
In this passage, the objects of auditory perception are compared with the objects of 
touch, taste and vision. We find likenesses of characters only in the objects of vision and 
hearing (contra Plato, who finds mimēmata of character in embroidery, weaving and 
architecture in Rep. iii 401a1 ff. See also Xenophon, Memorabilia iii.x 5). However, there is a 
difference between the objects of vision and the objects of hearing. Only the objects of 
hearing can truly be likenesses or imitations of character qualities.11 In the objects of 																																																								
10 συμβέβηκε δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις μηδὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμοίωμα τοῖς ἤθεσιν, 
οἷον ἐν τοῖς ἁπτοῖς καὶ τοῖς γευστοῖς, ἀλλ’ ἐν τοῖς ὁρατοῖς ἠρέμα (σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι 
τοιαῦτα, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μικρόν, καὶ <οὐ> πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν· ἔτι δὲ οὐκ 
ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰ γιγνόμενα σχήματα καὶ 
χρώματα τῶν ἠθῶν, καὶ ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἐπίσημα ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν· ... ), ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς 
ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν. Pol. viii 1340a29-39. The text and content of this passage are 
difficult to interpret. I follow OCT and accept Müller’s insertion of οὐ before πάντες at 
1340a31 contra Jowett 1885, 300. Another possible emendation suggested by Susemihl (see 
Susemihl and Hicks 1895, 593) consists in transposing ‘ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μικρόν’: σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι 
τοιαῦτα, καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσιν, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ μικρόν· If one accepts 
this emendation, the passage suggests that visual art is similar to characters in a small 
way, as opposed to being recognised as similar to characters only by some people. 
Whatever version one prefers, the gist of Aristotle’s point here is that music is more 
similar to character than visual art. 
11 Throughout Politics viii, Aristotle uses the terms ὁμοίωμα and the term μιμήμα as 
synonyms (see Halliwell 1990, 491). Consider for example Pol. viii 1340a26 ff. quoted above, 
where he begins his argument stating that we find ὁμοίωμα of character in melodies and 
concludes the proof noting that in melodies there are μιμήματα of character. Here I 
translate ὁμοίωμα and μιμήμα as “likeness” and “imitation”. The translation does not 
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vision, like paintings or statues, we don’t find likenesses of character strictly speaking. 
Rather, we find mere signs of character. Paintings and sculptures can give indications of 
emotional states like anger, for example by depicting the frowning face of an angry man, 
or his tense posture. But unlike music they can’t produce a likeness of character qualities. 
Music is especially suitable to produce likenesses of character because of its progressive 
nature. This distinctive feature of music is evident in melody and rhythm, the elements of 
the musical piece in which we find likenesses of character (Barker 2005, 108 ff.). In 
addition, one of the most evident differences between music and artistic representations 
like paintings or sculptures is precisely that music develops through time and is 
progressive. 
The Problems give us further evidence in support of this interpretation:12 
Why does what is heard, alone of perceptible objects, possess character? For, even 
when it is without words, nonetheless melody possesses character. But colour, 
smell or flavour don’t. Or it is because that which is heard alone has movement? 
Not, however, the movement in us to which the sound gives rise (for such 
movement is also related to the other [sc. perceptible objects]) ... but we perceive 
the movement which follows such and such a sound. This movement has a 
likeness [sc. of characters] both in the rhythms and in the melodic order of the 
high and low notes, but not in the mixture. For symphony doesn’t possess 
																																																																																																																																																																									
capture the nuance of meanings of these terms, but serves the purpose of clarifying 
Aristotle’s view on the educational power of music. 
12 Even if we can’t prove that Aristotle was the author of these texts, it seems impossible 
to deny the similarity between the views in the Problems xix 27 and 29 and in the Politics 
viii. In both texts, likenesses of characters are to be found in melos, rather than harmonia. 
Both texts suggest that there is a difference in the educational powers of music and the 
other arts (on these points, see Anderson 1980, 79). See Gevaert and Vollgraff 1901 xvii ff. 
for the thesis that Problems xix 27 and 29 are by Aristotle. See d’Eichthal and Reinach 1900 
for the view that they are not. The first attribution of this book of the Problems to 
Aristotle is by Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights i.xi. Barker 1990, 2:85 ff. suggests that the Problems 
xix were written by Aristotle’s students as a record of his research and as an aid to further 
enquiry in the late fourth or early third century. Louis 1993, 94 ff. agrees and argues that 
the musical problems were collected together at a later stage (hence the discrepancies 
between e.g. Prob. xix 7 and 37). Marenghi 1957 and Marenghi 1966 defend the 
authenticity (or at least the Aristotelian spirit) of the musical Problems and their 
connection with the acoustic problems. For further arguments in support of using the 
pseudo-Aristotelian Problems as aids to explain Aristotle’s views when they do not 
contradict the authentic texts see also Van der Eijk 2005 and Forster 1928. 
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character. ... These movements are connected with actions (praktikai), and actions 
are indicative of character.13 
In this passage, the progressive nature of melodies is emphasized, and supplemented with 
an analysis of the progressive nature or of the “movement” (kinēsis) of rhythm (cf. 
Aristoxenus’ Elementa Harmonica ii 34-35 in Da Rios 1954, 43-44). Melody and rhythm are 
movements not only because whenever a perceiving subject interacts with them she 
undergoes some kind of physical alteration (that happens in any case of perception). 
Rather, melody and rhythm are movements because they flow and change through time. 
They are perceptible successions of different, ordered, notes or durations. 
Not only are melody and rhythm movements, but they are also praktikai, i.e. connected 
with actions. This connection between melody, rhythm and actions requires further 
clarification. Often Aristotle calls something praktikos to mean that it leads, in some way 
or other, to action (see e.g. NE vi 1140a4 on phronēsis praktikē). But can melody and rhythm 
be praktikoi in that sense? do they make us act? Another passage of the Problems suggests 
that praktikos here has a slightly different meaning (see on this very same point Barker 
2005, 109-10): 
Why do rhythms and melodies, which are voice, resemble characters, whereas 
flavours do not, nor yet colours and odours? Is it because they are movements, as 
actions also are? Now activity possesses and produces character, but savours and 
colours do not produce it equally.14 
																																																								
13 Διὰ τί τὸ ἀκουστὸν μόνον ἦθος ἔχει τῶν αἰσθητῶν; καὶ γὰρ ἐὰν ᾖ ἄνευ λόγου μέλος, 
ὅμως ἔχει ἦθος· ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ χρῶμα οὐδὲ ἡ ὀσμὴ οὐδὲ ὁ χυμὸς ἔχει. ἢ ὅτι κίνησιν ἔχει μόνον 
οὐχί, ἣν ὁ ψόφος ἡμᾶς κινεῖ; τοιαύτη μὲν γὰρ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει· κινεῖ γὰρ καὶ τὸ 
χρῶμα τὴν ὄψιν· ἀλλὰ τῆς ἑπομένης τῷ τοιούτῳ ψόφῳ αἰσθανόμεθα κινήσεως. αὕτη δὲ 
ἔχει ὁμοιότητα ἔν τε τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν φθόγγων τάξει τῶν ὀξέων καὶ βαρέων, 
οὐκ ἐν τῇ μίξει. ἀλλ’ ἡ συμφωνία οὐκ ἔχει ἦθος. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰσθητοῖς τοῦτο οὐκ 
ἔστιν. αἱ δὲ κινήσεις αὗται πρακτικαί εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ πράξεις ἤθους σημασία ἐστίν. Prob. xix 27. 
Translations of the Problems are based, sometimes loosely, on Mayhew 2011. 
14 Διὰ τί οἱ ῥυθμοὶ καὶ τὰ μέλη φωνὴ οὖσα ἤθεσιν ἔοικεν, οἱ δὲ χυμοὶ οὔ, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὰ 
χρώματα καὶ αἱ ὀσμαί; ἢ ὅτι κινήσεις εἰσὶν ὥσπερ καὶ αἱ πράξεις; ἤδη δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐνέργεια 
ἠθικὸν καὶ ποιεῖ ἦθος, οἱ δὲ χυμοὶ καὶ τὰ χρώματα οὐ ποιοῦσιν ὁμοίως. Prob. xix 29. The 
idea that actions and melodies “produce” character can suggest either that they resemble 
character or that they instil it in the listener. Here, the difference between objects of 
vision and taste and objects of hearing in producing character is one of degree. This is 
consistent with Pol. viii 1340a29-39 quoted above, where Aristotle denies that objects of 
vision are likenesses of character, but admits that they might to some small extent be 
recognised as such (or that they might be recognised as such by some people). 
	 10	
In this passage, melody and rhythm are praktikoi because they are similar to actions. They 
are similar to actions because, like actions, they are movements. Actions, melodies and 
rhythms resemble and produce character because they are movements. 
The Problems give us a fuller picture of the similarities between music and character. 
Music is similar to character and to actions that produce character because it is 
progressive, because it is a movement. The similarity between musical movements and 
actions is the easiest to grasp. Musical movements involve orderly successions of high, 
low, long and short notes. This orderly succession makes them similar to actions: 
complex actions especially (like, say, saving a drowning child) involve the orderly 
succession of different temporal components. 
But what about characters? Characters, as opposed to actions, are states (hexeis), and 
notably states which are stable over time (see e.g. NE ii 1105b20). Yet, in Prob. xix 27, 
likenesses of characters are not found in static concordance or “symphony”, i.e. in the 
simultaneous and static playing of two or more notes. Rather, they are found in the 
successions of notes or durations. Perhaps, then, characters have to be understood here 
as dispositions displayed in one’s behaviour and in one’s feelings, and not as un-displayed 
dispositions. One’s character is activated during one’s life in a variety of ways. Hence, we 
can find “likenesses of character” only in a progressive form of art (see Rhet. i 1356a37 ff. 
and Rhet. ii 1377b21-1378a6, where ēthos indicates displayed character dispositions). 
The similarly complex order in variety in the temporal development of melodies, 
rhythms, actions and characters leads to the second similarity between them. Fine 
melodies or rhythms are similar to fine actions and fine characters. Aristotle’s notion of 
“the fine” (to kalon) is often, if not always, correlated with order or taxis (see Met. xiii 
1078a36-b1, EE ii 1218a21-23 and Richardson Lear 2006).15 Hence, the fineness of an action, 
character or a musical movement is connected to the “order in variety” they manifest in 
their temporal development. Whether fineness is exactly the same property when found 
in music and in action is hard to determine. Aristotle does not say enough, in both 
contexts, to allow us to extrapolate a definition of fineness. However, as I argue in what 
follows, fine music, fine actions and fine characters have, at the very least, a lot in 																																																								
15 Spelling out the exact nature of the relationship between fineness and order is difficult. 
The notions are surely connected, but it is hard to tell whether fineness or order is 
explanatorily basic. Without tackling this difficult question, all I argue here is that there 
is a similarity in the specific kind of order that fine actions, fine characters and fine 
melodies (or fine rhythms) display. This similarity gives us a reason to believe that there 
is a similarity in the specific way in which actions, melodies and characters can be 
recognized as fine. Aristotle trades on this similarity both in the passages of the Politics 
discussed in this paper and in the Nicomachean Ethics, where he argues that “the decent 
person, in so far as he is decent, rejoices at virtuous actions and is pained at bad actions, 
in the same way as the musical person is pleased by fine melodies, but pained by the bad 
ones”. NE ix 1170a8-11, Trans. Irwin 1999. 
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common. They all require an appropriate orderly temporal succession of a variety of 
appropriate components. 
There is no discussion in the Politics viii of the characteristics of fine melodies and 
rhythms. Aristotle does not dwell on the characteristics of fine melodies because he 
thinks that “musicians and philosophers who happen to know a lot about music” have 
already determined them (Pol. viii 1341b25). Nonetheless, we have reason to think that the 
fine melodies used for education are orderly because they are kept within the range of 
intervals of a single harmonia, or a single mode. Order, in this context, is partially a matter 
of involving the right components, and no alien components. At Pol. viii 1142a25, 
modulating melodies which include chromatisms (parakechrōsmena) are described as 
deviant (parekbaseis). At Pol. viii 1341a18 and ff., the flute, a modulating instrument, is 
banned from educational uses (cf. Plato’s Rep. iii 399d1-5). By analogy, it is plausible to 
think that fine rhythms are orderly because they follow a specific metrical unit or a 
specific ratio (on appropriate and inappropriate rhythms in speech see Rhetoric xxx 8 and 
cf. Rep. iii 398d and 400b1 ff.). 
In the same way, a fine action has to involve the right components, or the right temporal 
sub-stretches. Fine child-saving, for example, involves swimming fast and performing 
first aid procedures, as opposed to (say) swimming stylishly and telling the child off for 
her imprudence. Fine displayed character dispositions like bravery must have the right 
components too. A brave person will display her disposition in a variety of different ways. 
Depending on the occasion, she will fear certain things and not others: for example, she 
won’t fear loss of reputation but she will fear death. She will be “eager when in action, 
but quiet before action” (NE iii 1116a8-9). 
In order to be distinctive of fine melodies, rhythms, actions and characters, their orderly 
arrangement must be qualified further. It is not enough to involve the right components: 
a good, or appropriate arrangement of the components is also needed. Thus, some modes 
and rhythmic patterns but not others are appropriate for educational and fine melodies 
and rhythms (Pol. viii 1341b33-1342b18). Similarly, the arrangement of the temporal 
development of a fine action is appropriate for the circumstances and for the action’s 
goal, a goal which must itself be worthwhile: in a fine case of child-saving, swimming 
does not follow but it precedes  performing a CPR (see also Richardson Lear 2006, 120 and 
Cooper 1998, 274). In the same way, the complex variety of actions and passions displayed 
by a fine character state like bravery does not follow a random arrangement, but an 
appropriate order: the brave person is “whoever stands firm against the right things and 
fears the right things, for the right end, at the right time, and is correspondingly 
confident” (NE iii 1115b17-19). This feature is common to all virtues in so far as they are 
“means”. 
The temporal development of fine melodies, fine actions and fine characters is 
distinctively characterized by the appropriate orderly arrangement of the right 
components. From this we can move to the third and last aspect that fine actions, 
characters and melodies have in common: for Aristotle, fine melodies should be enjoyed 
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and listened to for their own sake and fine actions and characters should be enjoyed and 
pursued for their own sake. 
The importance of the right motives for performing fine actions emerges if we compare 
them to the performance of good productions (poiēseis). The performance of actions 
(praxeis) is different from the performance of productions (poiēseis). Productions need to 
be aimed at something other than themselves, and actions need not. While the house 
builder aims at something other than her performance of house building (i.e., the house), 
someone who performs a virtuous action needn’t have an aim other than the action itself. 
The builder has the goal of producing a good house. For the person who is performing an 
action, the excellent action itself is the goal (see NE vi 1140b7 ff. and Whiting 2002 for 
discussion). In this respect, our motives in pursuing virtuous actions are similar to what 
Aristotle takes to be the right motives in listening to musical performances. We should 
listen to fine music for its own sake, and not (or not only) for the sake of relaxation (see 
Pol. viii 1338a10 ff., Pol. viii 1139b35-1140a5, Pol. viii 1342a19-ff. See also MM i 1197a8-11 for 
a possibly related analogy between playing well and acting well). 
Arguably, this similarity led Aristotle to the thesis that taking the appropriate pleasure in 
musical performances is similar to taking the appropriate pleasure in fine actions: 
listening finely is remarkably similar to acting finely or virtuously: in both cases, having 
the wrong motives prevents the activity from being done finely. Since not all melodies, 
rhythms and actions are fine, merely enjoying the performance for its own sake is not 
enough to listen and act finely. To listen and act finely, one must perform actions and 
listen to melodies and rhythms that meet certain independent requirements. For 
example, they must follow an appropriate orderly arrangement. But listening to a fine 
melody or performing a fine action, in order to be finely done, needs to meet a further 
requirement: it needs to be done and enjoyed for its own sake. 
Although Aristotle’s account certainly depends on the accepted views of what counted as 
listening well and what did not, he does manage to provide it with some philosophical 
grounding. He reports that “the ancients” thought that music is important because it 
teaches us to spend our free time well, i.e. scholazein kalōs (Pol. viii 1337b30-32). In order to 
be able to spend our free time well, we need to be trained not only in disciplines that are 
useful towards money making, political activities and household management, but also in 
disciplines that are practised for their own sake (Pol. viii 1338a13 ff.). And music is 
precisely an example of such a discipline.  
However, not all types of musical performances are listened to for their own sake. Most 
tunes are played for the relaxation and amusement of the “uneducated masses” (Pol. viii 
1342a28 ff. and Pol. viii 1342a16ff. See also Pol. viii 1341a10 ff). This prevents them from 
being finely listened to or performed, as well as making, according to Aristotle, their 
performers and listeners “vulgar” (banausoi). Aristotle’s comments on “the many” and 
those who engage in productive work are the effect of a mistaken prejudice, but the 
crucial point of his views on musical and moral education can be defended independently 
of such prejudice. Perceiving the fine is surely difficult and requires a specific training. 
This view need not be accompanied by the obviously wrong assumption that most people 
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(women, slaves and productive workers) cannot undergo the relevant kind of training. 
Nor need it be accompanied by the view that performances for the sake of the listeners’ 
enjoyment are vulgar. 
Just as listening to music finely in the Politics involves listening to music for its own sake, 
so also acting finely in the Nicomachean Ethics requires doing virtuous actions for their 
own sake (see inter alia NE ii 1105a30-b3, NE iii 1115b12-13, NE iv 1120a23-25). Thus, 
virtuous actions should be done for their own sake and not merely for self interest or 
external incentives like monetary rewards (the view is echoed in Rhet. i 1366b35 ff., see 
Irwin 1985, Irwin 2011, Rogers 1993 and Taylor 2006, 92 fn. 12). This requirement 
distinguishes acting finely from producing well. It also distinguishes acting finely from 
some instances of acting viciously. Good productive performances are oriented towards 
the achievement of an external goal, i.e. the product of the production. Similarly, acting 
viciously is not necessarily done for its own sake, but can be aimed at an external goal 
such as apparent pleasure, fame or power (On vicious actions and vice, see Broadie 1991, 
90-91, Müller 2015 and Irwin 2001). In addition, the fact that acting finely is oriented to an 
internal goal distinguishes it from some of its close cousins: performances that might 
seem to be done finely but really aren’t, because they are guided by the wrong motives. 
For example, seemingly brave actions for the sake of a monetary reward, or for the sake 
of public honours (NE iii 1116a16).16 
The right motives matter for virtuous character states as well as for virtuous actions and 
fine music. Being oriented to the right goals distinguishes virtuous characters from their 
close cousins: real bravery is different from bravery for the sake of honour and bravery 
for the sake of fear. The really brave person acts for the sake of bravery itself, whereas 
bravery for the sake of fear or honour is governed by external goals (NE iii 1116a17-b3. 
See Hitz 2012, 271 ff. and Richardson Lear 2005, 154-55). 
The Politics and the Problems emphasise three similarities between music, actions and 
characters: actions, characters, melodies and rhythm are alike in their progressive 
development; fine actions, characters, melodies and rhythms need to display a similar 
order in variety; listening well to a melody, acting finely, and displaying correctly a 
virtuous character require the right motives and pleasures. These similarities between 
melodies, rhythms, actions and characters are important for the educational powers of 
music because they capture some distinctive features of virtuous actions and characters. 
These features differentiate virtuous actions done finely from good productions, from 
vicious actions and from good actions done from the wrong motives: good productions 
are aimed at an external goal, and so are good actions done for the wrong motives; 
vicious actions do not meet the formal requirement of following an appropriate order 
																																																								
16 See in particular the discussion of political courage and Hitz 2012, 271. For Aristotle, 
political courage is inferior because it involves acting for the wrong motives (for fear of 
punishments or externally bestowed honour, for example). 
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(though they might follow an inappropriate orderly arrangement) and needn’t be done 
for their own sake. 
The same features are distinctive of virtuous characters. The orderly nature of virtuous 
characters differentiates them from vicious characters. A vicious disposition presents a 
complex variety of actions and feelings, some of which might even be the same kind of 
feelings or actions displayed at times by the virtuous person (among these “shared” 
feelings and actions, Aristotle mentions fear and facing death in EE iii 1229b35 ff.). But a 
vicious disposition is different from a virtuous disposition in that its components are 
displayed in an arrangement so inappropriate that it leads to self destruction (NE ix 
1166b7-29). The right motives matter for virtuous character states too: they distinguish 
real virtues from virtues for the sake of honour or fear.  
Musical  Education as Cognitive Training 
The three similarities between music, actions and characters I described in the previous 
section can guide our interpretation of music’s educational function. They can explain 
why musical education teaches us both to recognise fine actions and characters and also 
to correctly rejoice at them. Musical students can learn to recognise fine characters and 
actions because these characters and actions are similar to fine melodies and rhythms. 
This explains why Aristotle envisages musical education as a kind of recognitional 
training: 
There is no doubt that whether someone himself participates in a performance 
makes a great difference to the development of certain qualities. For if people do 
not participate in performances, then one thing which is impossible or difficult is 
for them to become excellent judges (kritas) of them.17 
Thus, in the first place, since in order to discriminate it is necessary to take part to 
the performances, for this reason they should play while young, and abandon the 
performances once they get old, and they should be able to discriminate (krinein) 
fine things and rejoice correctly in virtue of what they learnt when young.18 
In this passages, Aristotle argues that young children should participate to musical 
performances and learn to play musical instruments. The reason why participating to 																																																								
17 οὐκ ἄδηλον δὴ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι ποιούς τινας, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς 
κοινωνῇ τῶν ἔργων· ἓν γάρ τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστι μὴ κοινωνήσαντας τῶν 
ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους. Pol. viii 1340b20-25.  
18 πρῶτον μὲν γάρ, ἐπεὶ τοῦ κρίνειν χάριν μετέχειν δεῖ τῶν ἔργων, διὰ τοῦτο χρὴ νέους 
μὲν ὄντας χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἔργοις, πρεσβυτέρους δὲ γενομένους τῶν μὲν ἔργων ἀφεῖσθαι, 
δύνασθαι δὲ τὰ καλὰ κρίνειν καὶ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς διὰ τὴν μάθησιν τὴν γενομένην ἐν τῇ 
νεότητι· Pol. viii 1340b35-39.  
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performances and even playing is important is because it helps young children to learn to 
recognize fine melodies in their succession of ascending, descending or jumpy notes.  
Children  learn to grasp the melodies’ appropriate orderly temporal development. Since 
fine melodies are similar to fine actions and characters, the recognitional skills acquired 
in the context of musical education are transferable to the context of moral education. If 
fineness in action and character is similar to fineness in music, learning to recognise the 
latter can be a way to learn to recognise the former. 
Aristotle uses the verb krinein to indicate the type of grasp that allows trained students to 
discriminate the right kind of music, actions and characters (Pol. viii 1340b35-39 and Pol. 
viii 1340a15-17). Krinein and its cognates are used to indicate both perceptual and 
intellectual grasps (DA ii 418a14, DA ii 424a5, DA iii 425b21, DA iii 427a20, DA iii 428a3). Since 
musical training is directed to children, we have a reason to suppose that it won’t be 
directed to the thinking part of the soul. Children’s intellect is not developed. The 
rational part of their soul will emerge only later in life (NE iii 1100a1, Rhet. ii 1384b23 and 
Pol. vii 1334b6-28). For this reason, musical education must engage first and foremost with 
the non-rational or perceptual part of the soul (compare with Plato’s Laws ii 664e3-8, Laws 
ii 670b2-3 and Rep. iii 401a5 ff.). 
Exactly how musical education engages with the non-rational part is open to speculation, 
for Aristotle doesn’t explain the details of its cognitive workings. All we know is that it 
teaches us to recognise fine melodies, actions and characters. Perhaps, what matters is 
that recognising a fine melody involves engaging with a particular melodic movement. 
Without this engagement, the relevant recognition cannot occur: our sensitivity to the 
order of a melody must follow its particular temporal development. It is enough for us to 
follow this orderly development perceptually, and we don’t need to understand a 
universal explanation as to why some melodies and not others are fine. Thus, there is 
some connection between the sensitivity to particulars that musical expertise and virtue 
require (see NE vi 1141b8-b20. Plato makes analogous considerations in Laws ii 667b-
670e).19 																																																								
19 For Aristotle’s disciple Aristoxenus music requires perceptual training precisely 
because it is progressive: 
Since this [sc. static and progressive] is the nature of music it is necessary to 
habituate perception and thought to discriminate finely what is static and what 
moves in the harmonised melodies. 
 
τοιαύτην δ’ ἐχούσης φύσιν τῆς μουσικῆς ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὸ ἡρμοσμένον 
συνεθισθῆναι τήν τε διάνοιαν καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν καλῶς κρίνειν τό τε μένον καὶ τὸ 
κινούμενον. Elementa Harmonica II 34, 25 ff. (Da Rios 1954, 44, 3 ff.) 
Here Aristoxenus might be expanding Aristotle’s views on the importance of training 
perception to discriminate the movements of fine music. 
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Aristotle argues that musical education is a kind of perceptual-recognitional training, but 
he does not explain precisely how it works. He is, however, more explicit on how musical 
education leads us to take pleasure in fine actions and fine characters for their own 
sake:20 
Someone who is accustomed to feel pleasure and pain in things that are alike [sc. 
to the real things] is close to someone who has the same attitude toward the real 
things. For example, if someone enjoys contemplating the image of something for 
no other reason than its shape, he will necessarily take pleasure as well in 
contemplating the thing itself whose image he is contemplating.21 
Taking pleasure in a mere likeness leads us to take pleasure in the “real thing”. Applying 
this principle to fine melodies and rhythms, we obtain that someone who is accustomed 
to enjoying them for their own sake will enjoy for their own sake the “real things” they 
are similar to: fine actions and fine characters. Since music is naturally pleasant, enjoying 
fine music for its own sake  leads us to take the appropriate pleasure in it and what it 
resembles (Pol. viii 1340b20-25). 
Musical education cannot lead us all the way toward virtue. It cannot really teach us to 
act finely or virtuously and to develop a fully blown virtuous character. Recognising fine 
actions and enjoying or pursuing them for their own sake is not sufficient by Aristotle’s 
own standards for acting finely or virtuously. Other conditions have to be satisfied: the 
virtuous action has to be chosen knowingly and from a stable and virtuous character 
state (NE ii 3). For example, enkratic actions might display the appropriate order in 
variety and be done for their own sake. Yet, they are not done virtuously because the 
agent who performs them is still conflicted. 
Even if this is right, it doesn’t undermine the idea that musical education can aid moral 
education. Musical education teaches us a recognitional skill that helps us to spot at least 
some of the features that characterise fine actions and characters. It also teaches us to 
take pleasure in fine actions and characters for their own sake. Thus, it gives us at least a 
starting point to learn to be good. 																																																								
20 Hitz 2012, 298 ff. suggests that taking pleasure in music teaches us to take pleasure in 
fine actions for their own sake and to recognise fine actions and characters. However, she 
(incorrectly, if I am right) assumes that the educational powers of music depend on its 
capacity to represent fine characters and action. Representational accounts are 
problematic, as I argued above, because it is difficult to see how music can represent 
character and actions if it is not accompanied by words or theatrical representations. 
21 ὁ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐθισμὸς τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ χαίρειν ἐγγύς ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν 
τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον οἷον εἴ τις χαίρει τὴν εἰκόνα τινὸς θεώμενος μὴ δι’ ἄλλην αἰτίαν 
ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν μορφὴν αὐτήν, ἀναγκαῖον τούτῳ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τὴν θεωρίαν, οὗ τὴν 
εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ, ἡδεῖαν εἶναι. Pol. viii 1340a23-28.  
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Conclusion 
Aristotle’s account of musical education is neither the result of the unreflective 
acceptance of a common belief nor a theory of blind emotion-transmission. Aristotle 
gives some philosophical grounding to the thesis that musical education forms our 
character. He maintains that musical education trains us to perceptually recognise fine 
actions and fine characters and also to take pleasure in them for their own sake. It does so 
because fine music is naturally pleasant and similar to fine actions and fine characters. 
Aristotle, then, has some good reasons to believe that musical education can habituate us 
to “correctly distinguishing and rejoicing at good characters and fine actions” (Pol. viii 
1340a15-17). 
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